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Reprinted from Qtfje gtfanbarb of (Empire, April 16th, 1909. 




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Prize €$$ay 

Subject : 

" Shall Canada have a 
Navy of Her Own ? " 

Prize of $400 won by . . . 





Special Committee. 

Sir WILLIAM MORTIMER CLARK, Kt., K.C., Ex-Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of 

Ontario . 

The HON. D. C. FRASER, Lieutenant-Governor of the Province of Nova Scotia. 

D. R. WILKIE, Esq., President of the Imperial Bank of Canada. 

H. J. WICKHAM, Esq. (Toronto), a Vice-President of the Navy League. 

Sir -George A. Drummond, K.C.M.G., Senator of Canada, President of the Montreal Branch of 

the Navy League. 
F. E. Hodgins, Esq., K.C., Toronto, Vice-President of the Toronto Branch of the Navy League. 
Sir Sandford Fleming, K.C.M.G., President of the Ottawa Branch of the Navy League. 
Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper, K.C.M.G., President of the Vancouver Branch of the Navy League. 
Captain Clive Phillipps-Wolley, President of the Victoria-Esquimalt Branch of the Navy League. 
James F. Robertson, Esq., President of the St. John, N.B., Branch of the Navy League. 
Beverley R. Armstrong, Esq., Honorary Secretary of the St. John, N.B., Branch of the Navy 

A. M. Nanton, Esq., President of the Winnipeg Branch of the Navy League. 
Nicol Kingsmill, Esq., K.C., Toronto, Member Executive Committee, Toronto Branch. 
Lieut. -Colonel W. N. Ponton, Belleville. 
His Honour Judge Barron, Stratford, Ont. 

Byron E. Walker, Esq., C.V.O., President Of the Canadian Bank of Commerce. 
W. Price, Esq., M.P., President of the Quebec Branch of the Navy League. 
Lieut.- Colonel W. Wood, Honorary Secretary of the Quebec Branch of the Navy League. 
J. McDonald Mowat, Esq., President of the Kingston Branch of the Navy League. 
Hon. F. L. Haszard, K.C., Premier of Prince Edward Island, President of the Charlottetown 

Branch of the Navy League. 
R. E. Harris, Esq., K.C., Halifax, N.S. 

H. W. Auden, Esq., M.A., Principal of Upper Canada College. 
The Rev. G. M. Wrong, M.A., Professor of History, University of Toronto. 
A. H. U. Colquhoun, Esq., B.A., LL.D., Deputy Minister of Education, Province of Ontario. 
Mrs. S. Nordheimer (Toronto) a Vice-President of the Navy League and President of the Daughters 

of the Empire Branch. 

Objects of the Navy League in Canada : 

Why the League should be supported 
. . . by all Loyal Canadians . . . 

The Navy League is in no sense a partisan organization. It works for the welfare of 
the Empire, the preservation of peace, and the prosperity of the British Community. 

Here in Canada its objects are : — 

1 . To bring home to Canadians a sense of their dependence on and interest in the Naval 

strength of the Empire. 

2. To press upon public attention the need for a Canadian Naval Defence Force. 

3. To show how Canada can best help the Royal Navy — locally — in time of war. 

4. " As knowledge is power "so want of knowledge is weakness. This League seeks to 

remedy the prevailing lack of information on Naval matters by distributing 
literature on the subject to its members and the public press, and by promoting the 
teaching of Naval history in schools. 


Shall Canada have a Navy of Her Own } 

The Prize Essay. 

:: BY :: 


Reprinted from " The Standard of Empire/' 

The following contribution has been awarded the $400 prize 
offered by the Navy League of Canada for the best essay on the 
question : " Shall Canada have a Navy of Her Own ? " The 
author is Mrs. W. Hewes Oliphant, 210, Simcoe Street, Toronto, 


No student of the present day, in view of the examples 
which crowd the history of the past, will attempt to deny to 
the ships which traverse the world's great highways, an 
influential, even a commanding share in moulding national 
destinies. No State has ever attained greatness without assert- 
ing and maintaining its title to the free and common use of 
the sea. No land-locked country has ever achieved any con- 
siderable sovereignty. 

It is impossible to read Captain Mahan's admirable book, 
" The Influence of Sea Power upon History," to follow his 
engrossing story of the development of the great world Powers, 
to trace in his pages the growth, the perils, the conflicts, the 
triumphs of the nations of the past, in all of which the ships 
of history took their magnificent part ; to mark, with him, 
the progress of Britain through the centuries which have 
developed and crowned her supremacy, without yielding a 
willing assent to his deduction that power on the high seas 
means, in the case of any nation, respect and an influential 
voice abroad, peace, progress, and development at home. 

The subject of this paper presents, to every Canadian who 
professes an intelligent interest in his country, problems of 
paramount importance. And it is quite possible that our 
past consideration of these problems has, for reasons of one 
or another kind, not been really either independent or adequate. 
In the first place, we have a sort of national sensitiveness, 
almost amounting to self- consciousness, which has made many 
Canadians whose devotion to their country is beyond question 
impatient of suggestion or advice originating, or supposed to 
originate, in Great Britain. This restiveness of attitude is 
not confined to official hint, remonstrance, or what not, but 
to any governmental theory or conclusion which is not directly 
and primarily drawn by ourselves, from our own experience, 
in our own interests. We are impatient of anything which 
seems to savour of dictation or even advice from any stand- 
point but our own. The friendly Briton, official, semi-official, 
or unofficial, who tours among us, addresses our Canadian 
clubs, suggests, with greater or less modesty, according to his 
temperament, in what respects our public systems or ideals 
or ethics are faulty, or where we have failed in our duty, 
whether as dependents upon Great Britain or as members of 
a world-wide Imperial family, or even how we may best work 
out our own destiny as an independent nation, has done much, 
by his mere remonstrant presence, to divert or prevent fair- 
minded investigation from the purely Canadian point of view. 
That some Canadians held similar opinions before the Briton 
voiced them is not to the point. The result of his intervention 
in the supersensitive Canadian mind, is to make the controversy 
no longer Canadian only in its purpose and scope. The view 
is that the controversy ought to be settled by and among 
Canadians, and in the interests, primarily, at all events, of 
Canada. The Imperial purposes involved in the controversy 
become secondary in significance and importance. When the 
Canadian mind is made up from the Canadian standpoint, 
Canada will be prepared to discuss such imperial questions 
as this with the other members of the family. Meantime, 
Canada's conclusions and attitude are to be the result of 
Canadian inquiry and discussion. Another circumstance has 
hitherto stood in the way of a fair and just consideration of 
these problems by Canadians. We have been so busily engaged 
in growing up to national stature, and our growth has been so 
absorbing in its rapidity and consequent demands upon our 
young vitality, that we have had literally neither time nor 
strength to make full plans for the protection of the national 

structure in the building of which we have so freely expended 
every present resource, and have with such high confidence 
pledged the resources of the future. 

But it is no longer possible for any Canadian to deny to his 
country the status and dignity of a nation. British ideals 
and practice assure to us the continuance and growth of the 
powers of self-government with which we have been so long 
entrusted. Our connection with the British Crown, though 
informed by the deepest and most strenuous loyalty, is a con- 
nection which involves no economic fetters, and which is rapidly 
tending in all foreign relations towards freedom of contract 
and full powers of management, in respect of Canadian affairs. 
We make our own laws. No attempt is made at Imperial con- 
trol of our trade tariffs with the world, including Britain. It 
seems no longer possible to withhold from us the right to 
make our own treaties, even in cases which may indirectly 
affect Imperial interests. British garrisons have been with- 
drawn, and Canada manages, without review or appeal, her 
military affairs. The great fortified harbours of Canada, 
which Britain deemed an essential part of that great maritime 
system by which she maintained her naval supremacy and 
effectively policed the world, have been assumed by Canada, 
In her outlook towards Britain, Canada, while loyal, is inde- 
pendent. She faces the rest of the world, in every essential 
sense, a free, autonomous, and Imperial Power. 

The time has, therefore, come when this, and every other 
problem which nationhood presents, press for solution upon 
an adult country, whose leading strings are essentially severed. 
And the solution, to be acceptable and permanent, must be 
reached by applying Canadian minds to questions which 
are primarily of Canadian moment. Of these none is of greater 
interest or presents greater complexity than that of a Canadian 
Navy. It is not difficult to understand and appreciate 
the historical reasons for the interest we have always taken 
in the improvement of the Canadian Militia, while comparative 
indifference has marked our treatment of Canadian naval 
questions. Our geographical position and vicinage have 
hitherto accounted for the one and served in some degree to 
excuse the other. While we have had long frontiers, we 
have had little property at risk upon the seas. Our possessions 
have not attracted attention, or been likely to excite cupidity 
elsewhere than among our very good neighbours to the south. 
Such of our seaports as seemed vulnerable have been fortified 

by Great Britain, and woven into her Imperial naval fabric. 
We have rested content in the comfortable knowledge that 
an Imperial North Atlantic or North Pacific Squadron always, 
either actually or potentially, hovered about our eastern and 
western sea coasts, sheltering them and our commerce under 
the historic prestige of which it was the symbol. 

But the seaborne commerce proper to Canada has now 
assumed very considerable proportions, both eastward and 
westward, and it would seem that, if we are to learn and apply 
the lessons of history, and unless we are to repudiate the burdens 
incident to that independent commercial sovereignty which 
we have boldly claimed and fairly won, we must establish 
and demand, to secure the continuity and growth of our great 
and increasing seagoing trade, a thoroughly well grounded 
belief in the minds and consciences of other nations that we 
are ourselves able to give it an adequate and continuous pro- 
tection. It is true that we already have the nucleus of a 
Navy ; that is to say, we have ships which are exercising 
true naval functions. 

Since 1885 we have protected our fisheries, both on the 
Atlantic seaboard and on the great lakes, by means of armed 
vessels, and our ships have done valuable hydrographic survey 
work, fitting work for a navy. 

But in the wide, independent sense in which our sovereignty 
is conceived, the burden has never yet been acknowledged, 
much less lifted to our young shoulders. 

In these days of " practical politics " it seems certain that 
the shouldering of any great financial oligation must be pre- 
ceded by an intelligent realisation, first, of a duty with regard 
to it, and, second, of its significance and extent. Unless Cana- 
dians are persuaded (they will not be dragooned) into a belief 
in the existence of such a duty, it is unlikely that they will 
volunteer. Once convinced, they will not be deterred from 
undertaking and performing it by faint-hearted or penny- 
wise considerations. The Canadian attitude towards recog- 
nised obligations is, above all, essentially honest. 

The first question, then, is whether there exists now a Cana- 
dian duty in the matter of a naval establishment. Or, it may 
be stated in another way, to emphasise the two elements which 
enter into the question : Do we, as Canadians, owe such a 
duty to Canada ; that is, to ourselves ? And, if we do, is 
it a duty which calls for performance under existing Canadian 
conditions ? 


The question, in its double aspect, must appeal to Cana- 
dians, if at all, as arising out of, and referable to, the independent 
commercial sovereignty already spoken of. It may be taken 
for granted that a Canadian navy, established for, and serving 
Canadian aims and objects, and managed by Canada from the 
Canadian standpoint and in Canadian interests, will, like her 
troops, be freely tendered for Imperial service on any occasion 
of Imperial stress. This, being granted once for all, disappears 
from the problem, and the Canadian view may be put and argued 
without reference to it. 

Any existing Canadian duty ought to be referred primarily 
to the undisputed present national status of Canada. She is 
a country with sea-going traffic upon two oceans, and, therefore, 
a navy is an essential part of a well balanced national equipment. 
That Canada should have soldiers is, in this view, accepted 
both in theory and practice. That she should have sailors 
also is only another way of stating the original proposition 
that Canada has attained national stature. She cannot hope, 
limping into the arena of the world, to become a commercial 
factor in its progress. She must march in bearing those con- 
vincing insignia of her maturity and strength which a reasonably 
perfect equipment affords. She must hold up her head among 
the nations whose peer she proclaims herself to be, pointing 
to those twin guarantees of her efficiency — an army and a navy. 

This first consideration, viz., the vital necessity of a navy 
to the national equipment of Canada, really covers much more 
of the ground usually debated than is plain in a casual glance. 
Clear ideas with regard to the proper functions of a navy must 
underlie the discussion. It will involve an examination of 
Canadian geographical and trade factors, because naval equip- 
ment becomes desirable or imperative in proportion to the extent 
to which the country's geographical position and its trade 
call for this branch of equipment. It will be concerned with 
the country's foreign relations, actual and possible, because 
Canadians will not blindly accept the burdens imposed by a 
naval equipment for the sake of protection against a mere 
bugbear or series of bugbears. It will call for careful inquiry 
into all questions of method and cost, because the nature and 
expense of equipment must bear true relations to the very 
purposes which the equipment is to serve. And all these 
questions must be examined and answered in the Canadian 
sense as distinguished from the Imperial. 

There appear to be two principal modern theories with regard 
to the true functions of a navy as part of the national equip- 
ment. They are clearly stated, and strikingly discussed by 
Admiral P. H. Colomb. One theory assigns as its function 
the local defence of the country itself, the other the preservation 
of the great lines of trade communication. Both theories are, 
it will be observed, based upon the fundamental idea of defence. 
Aggression is no part, though it may become an incident in 
the working out of either theory. And each theory has been 
formulated as part of a policy applicable to Imperial conditions. 
In their application to those conditions, they have almost 
become rival theories, though they have never lost their purely 
defensive character. The extreme adherents of the first have, 
in theory, girded the navy about the British islands to repel 
attacks upon their coasts. The adherents of the second have 
advocated the distribution of the navy along the great esta- 
blished ocean highways of trade, viewing the ocean commerce 
of Britain as the true point of attack, to be guarded at all 
costs, by " keeping open the great sea routes from the heart 
to the extremities of the Empire." As Admiral Colomb says, 
the great trade routes bear " the income of the nation, scattered 
broadcast over the ocean." The key of the position, in the 
application of both theories, is the channel and other waters 
adjacent to Britain. But in the application of the home defence 
theory, it is the key because those waters are the avenues of 
hostile approach to the land itself. In the application of 
the other it is the key, because in those waters converge the 
trade routes which bear the nations' wealth, and the theory 
assumes that if the communications are preserved intact, 
no successful land attack can be made. The weight of the 
best naval opinion seems in favour of this view. 

The statement of these two modern theories goes far to assist 
in defining the functions which a Canadian Navy should be 
designed, under present Canadian conditions, to perform. 
Our conditions are not essentially similar to those which, in 
Imperial discussions, make the theories rival rather than 
complementary. Our ocean commerce for the most part at 
least, is borne over the same great lines of communication 
which bear the commerce designed to be protected by the 
Imperial navy, and, indeed, forms part of that commerce. To 
assist in the protection of those highways may, and doubtless 
will be, in time of war, an appropriate use to which to put a 
Canadian navy. But it cannot be its primary or normal 
purpose, under existing conditions, even in case of war. Halifax, 

St. John, Quebec, Montreal, indeed the whole of the lower 
St. Lawrence River ; Victoria, Vancouver, and, in the near 
future, Prince Rupert, all peculiarly ours, are possible points 
of attack, and must be made invulnerable, if at all, not by 
fortification merely, but by fleets of our own, flying our flag 
and patrolling the waters by which these points may be ap- 
proached. The prime necessity, and therefore the paramount 
function, of our navy, must be the protection of our trade. 
Our commerce must safely get into and out of our ports, and, 
to that end, our seaboard must be effectively protected by 
our navy. 

The commerce to be protected includes, of course, at all 
times, our fisheries and our Customs. 

Our geographical position is unique. Our immediate neigh- 
bour is the United States, and the border line stretches from 
ocean to ocean. " E. B. 0.," in the " National Review," 
Vol. XL VIII., goes so far as to say that it would not be possible 
for us to defend our border against an attack from that quarter. 
And he advises an acceleration of our population in the great 
West as a practical assurance of ultimate security. But the 
existence of any insecurity which the tremendous length of our 
frontier may involve does not directly bear upon the present 
discussion. Until the abrogation of present treaty obligations, 
neither country can maintain warships upon the great lakes 
forming so large a part of the frontier. In the most unlikely 
event of a conflict with our neighbour, our possession of sea- 
going war vessels will certainly not be a source of weakness. 
Nobody suggests either the length of our frontier or the impro- 
bability of such a conflict as a ground for reducing our Army, 
and neither circumstance ought to affect the present question. 

Then we have two seaboards, perhaps three, for who shall 
say that Canada is not soon to have an Arctic outlet, by Arctic 
ports, for her commerce ? With commercial ports upon, and 
with products traversing, three oceans, it seems inevitable that 
our equipment must include a navy, or our ports and their 
trade, which is our wealth, must be at the mercy of the first 
strong hand to strike at them. The blow, if it come, will not 
fall upon our merchant ships when they have reached the area 
of that protection which Britain gives the great lines of com- 
munication, but in and about our home ports and our home 

And what of the volume of trade demanding protection, 
its great growth, its absorbing and magnificent prospects ? 


Canadian merchant fleets ply from her Atlantic ports to all 
the markets of Europe, Africa, the Atlantic States, the West 
Indies, and South America, and from her Pacific ports to 
Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan, all bearing cargoes 
whose production and carriage are vital to our national growth. 
With the opening for agriculture of the great territory traversed 
by the new transcontinental railway, whose gradients are to 
make possible the shipment of our harvests to Europe by the 
Suez Canal, with the construction of railways to the Hudson 
Bay, and the establishment of the new carrying facilities from 
new seaports there to the food markets of Europe, with the 
remarkable and encouraging advance in ships and exports and 
imports using the established Atlantic routes, with the impetus 
which the All-Red Line must give to our shipping in every 
direction, we cannot longer hesitate to admit the existence 
of a national duty to insure the permanence of conditions so 
vital to the growth of the country. Whatever equipment 
may be necessary to their maintenance Canadians will cheerfully 
furnish and honestly keep up. 

Our relations, actual and possible, with other countries call 
for some examination. Do they involve risk to the Canadian 
interests which have been imperfectly described, and is a 
protective equipment necessary for any reason arising out of 

The time has not yet arrived when peaceful arbitrament 
shall supersede national strength and national readiness for 
conflict. The peace proposals with which altruists so much 
concern themselves do not, as yet, possess any reliable signi- 
ficance. Side by side with the more or less candid adherence 
by European nations to the theoretically beautiful doctrine 
of universal peace, they are diligently preparing themselves 
not for war, perhaps, but for geographical alterations — 
modifications of the world's map, which may not be compassed 
without physical contest. Their preparation is largely and 
intelligently directed towards naval armament. Not only in 
the settlement of European boundaries, but in all questions 
affecting her colonial and commercial interests that may arise, 
in Asia or Africa, Britain must have a voice. Imperial con- 
siderations must range her upon one side or the other of prac- 
tically every controversy that may take place in the civilised 
world. This is an incident of her greatness. We would not 
have it otherwise. Our destinies are bound up in her. That 
in the course of these controversies she may find herself at 
any time bound to defend Imperial policy and Imperial interest 


against another Power or a combination of other Powers, and 
that without any aggression on her part, requires no argument 
to make it plain. When that occasion comes, a vigilant and 
prepared foe may reasonably be expected to strike at a vulner- 
able part of the Imperial body. What point more vulnerable 
than our navyless Atlantic and St. Lawrence seaports ? 

But Europe and its political complications are not the whole 
of Canada's possible embarrassment, perhaps not even the prin- 
cipal part. Our Western possessions realise acutely, even now, 
the great Asiatic immigration problems which the recent history 
of China and Japan may force upon us. Leaving out of the 
question the treaty between Great Britain and Japan, and the 
possible difficulties in our scheme of self-government which 
it may introduce, we must recognise the peculiar peril in which 
we stand if Japan, the most recent addition to important 
world-powers, should insist upon full recognition by us of her 
new status. Japan's attitude is that she has fought her way 
into the realm of national recognition. She is sensitive to a 
degree, and may shortly be found claiming, as an Eastern 
nation, rights of re-immigration and intercourse upon a Western 
basis. Suppose that Japan desires to foster the emigration of 
her subjects. We are conversely inviting immigration. But 
we will not have it from Asia. One need not be an alarmist 
in any sense to feel and realise that the situation may easily 
become critical. It must not be forgotten that further com- 
plications arise out of the existing treaty, and while the present 
Canadian arrangement has, at all events partially, composed 
Japanese irritation for the time, there is manifested by the 
Japanese people a disposition to evade the arrangement, and 
there is a clear feeling of dissatisfaction with it among our own 
people, accompanied by an unrest and agitation which are at 
least disturbing. Again, we look for the vulnerable spot, and 
find it in our navyless Pacific seaboard. Do we not need a 
protective equipment there ? 

Upon the whole, it seems impossible to reject the conclusion 
that Canada should, for Canadian reasons, have a navy ; having 
regard to the functions of a naval equipment, our geographical 
and trade conditions and our relations, actual and possible, 
to the outside world. 

The questions of method and cost remain to be considered, 
and may be coveniently treated together. On the one hand, 
we do not want a mere toy ; on the other, the conditions do 
not call for a fleet composed of Dreadnoughts and of Imperial 


In time of war we must as yet leave to Britain the task of 
confining the enemy within his own home ports and cutting off 
his outside sources of supply, directing our efforts towards 
the efficient protection of our sea gates and the peaceful traffic 
coming into and going out of them. In time of peace we must 
direct our efforts towards the building and preparation of ships 
and the training of men, with a view to a moderate but always 
efficient and continuous present strength, and to a capacity 
for such prompt additional mobilisation as will, without friction 
or strain, bring our navy at any time to such a war footing 
as becomes our needs. 

Without attempting technical details, an outline plan may 
be presented which draws upon past experience and suggestion, 
in an endeavour to combine and adjust. The details must be 
left to trained hands. 

Ships to a number and of type and armament bearing a fair 
peace proportion to a total war strength suitable to and reason- 
ably sufficient for Canadian defence in the sense already 
mentioned, should be built, armed, manned, and put into 
commission, at reasonable intervals. For this purpose a 
moderate programme, providing for, say, two or three such 
ships a year for five years, or every other year for ten years, 
might be adopted without unduly taxing the resources of the 

Meantime, moderate subsidies should be offered to the great 
Canadian companies which handle our merchant shipping, so 
as to induce them to build, for the merchant service, ships of 
a type capable of being quickly armed, and of so taking their 
places in a defensive naval scheme should occasion arise. The 
subsidies should be conditional upon satisfactory compliance 
with carefully designed types, and should secure immediate 
Governmental control and possession when required. 

The whole plan should be carefully prepared and worked out 
with attention to technical detail as regards efficiency of 
construction and armament, and should be aimed at securing 
continuity of preparation. 

The manning of a Canadian navy should not present much 
greater difficulty than the maintenance of a Canadian army. 
A naval volunteer force, with a provision for suitably equipped 
training stations, and for voluntary term service, would be as 
likely to appeal to the ever ready loyalty of young Canadians 
as a volunteer militia force, with term service and the liability 
to serve. Views somewhat like these were put forward by 
Lord Brassey in a speech before the Koyal Colonial Institute 


in 1878, but as part of a scheme for augmenting the Navy 
from the Imperial standpoint. He spoke of a " Colonial Naval 
Volunteer Force or Reserve," and pointed to the Canadian 
fishermen of our maritime provinces as admirable material 
for such a force. His idea was not to draw them away from 
the labour market altogether, but to take advantage of their 
winter leisure to make them into available naval material. 
If the objective point is made an active naval Canadian estab- 
lishment instead of an Imperial reserve, there is no reason to 
suppose that training for such an establishment or enlisting 
for term service will be less popular or produce less satisfactory 
results than the equivalent provisions in our militia scheme. 
Out of our trained volunteer militia we have evolved a small 
regular enlisted army. Why should we not, out of a trained 
volunteer naval force, evolve a regular enrolled navy ? The 
periods of training must be longer and more continuous, and, 
according to naval traditions, should commence at a somewhat 
earlier age. The enlisting or enrolling, during or after the 
completion of the training, would probably keep pace with the 
building and commissioning of the ships. Behind the manned 
ships and behind the subsidised merchant cruisers, ready to 
help to man the latter in time of war and liable to be called 
on for service, we should in time have an ample trained reserve, 
capable of efficient service in a Canadian navy as their brothers 
are in the Canadian army. 

The command of our ships and the training of the men 
requires officers, and they also must be trained. For some time, 
no doubt, we should require Imperial assistance in this respect. 
So we did for our army in its early days. But as time and 
training have given us Canadians capable of commanding 
armies, so time and training will give us Canadians fit to 
command ships. With this in view, we should, no doubt, 
establish a Naval College as we have established a Military 
College. The necessary expansion of educational facilities 
would naturally and appropriately follow our first decisive 
move navywards. 

In establishing training stations, it seems desirable to bring 
them to the people — to localise them. We may, therefore, 
perhaps, besides establishing such stations in or near some of our 
Atlantic and Pacific ports, follow the lead of our neighbours, 
who do not look upon training naval stations in ports of the 
Great Lakes as contrary to existing treaty provisions. 

The cost of gradually building up a moderate naval estab- 
lishment on the lines suggested is not beyond our means or 
disproportionate to the need for the expenditure. It is a sort 


of insurance premium upon our national commerce. So is the 
expenditure upon our militia establishment. But even if the 
expenditure were larger, and the wealth insured by it smaller 
and incapable of that magnificent expansion for which we con- 
fidently look, we still owe to ourselves and to the world the 
duty of that measure of national equipment which isHhe burden 
of this paper, a duty which we cannot afford longer to remain 

Australia and New Zealand are both moving towards naval 
establishment. The writer (Hordern) of a remarkable article 
on Australian Naval Defence in the " United ServiceMagazine," 
Vol. XXXIV., takes strong ground against Australian contri- 
butions towards the Imperial Navy, in the administration of 
which Australia has no voice. He says that Australia's need 
for a navy is not so much the protection of her coast trade 
as " the maintenance of her freedom and the protection of her 
ideals against foreign interference." He is referring to Japanese 
immigration as a menace which only awaits the expiry of the 
Anglo-Japanese treaty to become an active peril ; and counsels 
Australia to be ready, when the treaty expires, to offer herself 
to Britain as an ally, instead of Japan, and with a fleet. Recent 
advices from Australia indicate that her subsidy to the Imperial 
Navy will be withdrawn, and that she will build a navy of her 
own. Premier Deakin had already foreshadowed this in his 
naval scheme, " Navy League Annual," 1908-9, p. 160. 

The proceedings of the Colonial Conference in 1907 disclose 
a considerable and very satisfactory advance towards soundness 
of view when compared with the report of the Naval Reserves 
Commission of 1902. In that report Colonial reserves were 
treated as mere nurseries for the Imperial Navy. The attitude 
of the Conference of 1907 towards the whole question was, 
however, much broader and more liberal. The Imperial 
representatives practically conceded the independent right of 
each colony to deal with her own naval problems from her 
own standpoint. This brings Canadians face to face with the 
Canadian question. Of its ultimate triumphant answer by 
Canada there can be no doubt. In her present solid achievement 
and her future splendid promise, and in the hostages she ha3 
given to fortune, it is already answered. 

8. Straker & Sons, 22, Leadenhall St., E.C. 





Dear Sir, 

Please enrol my name as a Member of 
your Branch for which purpose I enclose the sum 
of $2.00 (f) being first annual subscription. 

Yours truly, 


(f) The annual subscription, which is payable yearly in advance ton anniversary 
of joining, entitles Member to " The Navy " for one year. 

Name of Branch. Name and Address. 

Toronto - - - - F. D. Porter - - 311, King St. E., Toronto. 

Daughters of the Empire Miss Collett - - St. James Chrs., Toronto. 

Victoria-Esquimalt - - Joseph Peirson - 'Victoria, B.C. 

Vancouver - Captain Eddie - Vancouver, B.C. 

Winnipeg ' - - Lt.-Col. Ruttan, C.E. City Hall, Winnipeg. 

Ottawa - Lt.-Col. Wm. White, C.M.G. - - Ottawa. 

Kingston - - - - J. McDonald Mowat - - ; - Kingston. 

Montreal- - - - Edward Parker ' - c/o Canadian Sugar Re- 
fining Co. Montreal. 

Quebec - Lt.-Col. Wm. Wood - Quebec. 

Charlottetown, P.E.I. - Major W. W. Weeks Charlottetown, P.E.I. 


There is only one British Empire, 

There is onfy one British Empire 

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unique must be the news published 
by that paper. 

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